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F. Schmefer 7/2/85

STATEMENT

OF

THE HONORABLE
JAMES L. BUCKLEY
UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE
FOR SECURITY ASSISTANCE, SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY

BEFORE

THE

HOUSE FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMITTEE

OCTOBER 1, 1981

MR. CHAIRMAN, LADIES AND GENTLEMEN OF THE COMMITTEE:

I WELCOME THIS OPPORTUNITY TO TESTIFY ON BEHALF OF THE ADMINISTRATION'S PROPOSAL TO SELL AWACS AIRCRAFT AND THE F-15 ENHANCEMENT PACKAGE TO SAUDI ARABIA BECAUSE IT IS CRITICAL TO THE PRESIDENT'S POLICY FOR THE PROTECTION OF AMERICAN INTERESTS IN THE MIDDLE EAST.

LET ME PLACE THESE SALES IN THE PERSPECTIVE OF THE ADMINISTRATION'S OVER-ALL OBJECTIVES. SIMPLY STATED, THEY ARE TO HELP ACHIEVE A WORLD IN WHICH NATIONS ARE FREE TO PURSUE THEIR OWN PEACEFUL ENDS WITHOUT THE THREAT OF EXTERNAL AGGRESSION OR INTIMIDATION. WE ARE CONFIDENT THAT IN SUCH A WORLD OUR OWN INTERESTS WILL BE BEST PROTECTED.

TODAY THE FREE WORLD FACES CHALLENGES THAT ARE OF SUCH A SCALE THAT THEY CAN BE MET ONLY IF THE STRENGTH OF THE UNITED STATES IS BROUGHT TO BEAR. YET WE CANNOT DO THE JOB ALONE. WE CAN ONLY DO IT IF WE ARE ABLE TO WORK IN CLOSE COOPERATION WITH OTHER, STRATEGICALLY IMPORTANT NATIONS; AND NONE ARE AS IMPORTANT TO THE ECONOMIES OF THE INDUSTRIALIZED WEST AS THOSE BORDERING THE PERSIAN GULF.

WE WERE PAINFULLY REMINDED OF THIS FACT DURING THE OIL EMBARGO OF 1973 AND '74. UNTIL THE LAST FEW YEARS, HOWEVER, THE ONE WORRY WE DID NOT HAVE WAS FOR THE PHYSICAL SECURITY OF THE RESOURCES ON WHICH WE AND OUR ALLIES WILL HAVE SO GREAT A DEPENDENCE UNTIL WELL INTO THE NEXT CENTURY. WE COULD DEPEND -- OR THOUGHT WE COULD DEPEND -- FIRST ON THE BRITISH AND THEN THE SHAH FOR THE AREA'S PROTECTION.

BUT NOW, THE OIL PRODUCING NATIONS OF THE ARABIAN PENINSULA FACE A VARIETY OF THREATS.

THE INVASION OF AFGHANISTAN WAS THE STARKEST POSSIBLE DEMONSTRATION THAT SOVIETS ARE NOW PREPARED TO USE THEIR NEW MILITARY CAPABILITIES IN SUPPORT OF POLITICAL OBJECTIVES -- AT LEAST SO LONG AS THEY CAN DO SO WITH RELATIVE IMPUNITY.

TWO WELL-ARMED SOVIET PROXIES -- ETHIOPIA AND SOUTH YEMEN -- STRADDLE THE APPROACHES TO THE RED SEA AND ARE ABLE TO THREATEN VITAL SAUDI INTERESTS ON BOTH ITS SHORES. AND FINALLY, AT THE OUTBREAK OF THE IRAQ-IRAN WAR, IRAN SENT COMBAT AIRCRAFT ACROSS THE GULF TO UNDERSCORE ITS CAPACITY TO THREATEN THE AREA'S OIL-PRODUCING FACILITIES.

IN SHORT, IN LESS THAN HALF A DECADE, THE PERSIAN GULF HAS BEEN TRANSFORMED. WHILE IT WAS ONCE A SECURE

SOURCE OF THE PETROLEUM ESSENTIAL TO WESTERN ECONOMIES, IT HAS BECOME AN AREA WHICH IS EXTREMELY VULNERABLE TO ATTACK BY REGIONAL FORCES, WHILE EXPOSED TO A POTENTIAL OFFENSIVE BY THE SOVIET UNION.

TO MEET THESE CHALLENGES, WE ARE SEEKING A NEW SET OF RELATIONSHIPS IN THE PERSIAN GULF AND THE MIDDLE EAST THAT CAN HELP OUR FRIENDS COPE WITH REGIONAL THREATS, ENHANCE THE SECURITY OF THE WEST'S PRINCIPAL SOURCES OF IMPORTED OIL, AND ESTABLISH AN INFRASTRUCTURE THAT CAN RECEIVE AND SUPPORT OUR RAPID DEPLOYMENT FORCES SHOULD WE NEED TO DISPATCH THEM TO MEET A MAJOR CHALLENGE.

WHILE ENSURING THE SECURITY OF SAUDI ARABIA IS OBVIOUSLY NOT THE ONLY ELEMENT IN THIS EFFORT, IT IS CLEARLY A KEY ONE, AND NOT JUST BECAUSE ITS COOPERATION IS ESSENTIAL TO OUR PLANS FOR THE SECURITY OF THE PERSIAN GULF. SAUDI ARABIA IS THE CENTER OF THE PRO-WESTERN FORCES IN ISLAM. ITS ANTI-COMMUNIST POSITIONS OFFER A NON-RADICAL APPROACH TO MODERNIZATION, AND IT IS DEVELOPING AN INFLUENCE THAT REACHES FAR BEYOND THE ARAB WORLD. IT CURRENTLY DEDICATES, FOR EXAMPLE, A SIGNIFICANT PERCENTAGE OF ITS NATIONAL INCOME TO AID TO SUCH ISLAMIC NATIONS AS SUDAN, SOMALIA, NORTH YEMEN, TURKEY, PAKISTAN AND MOROCCO, NATIONS WHERE THE U.S. HAS IMPORTANT STRATEGIC INTERESTS AS WELL.

THUS, THE SUCCESS OF U.S. POLICY IN THE REGION WILL DEPEND IN LARGE PART ON OUR ABILITY TO DEVELOP A CLOSE WORKING RELATIONSHIP WITH SAUDI ARABIA; AND THIS IN TURN DEPENDS ON OUR OWN WILLINGNESS TO HELP THE SAUDIS ACQUIRE, IN THEIR OWN RIGHT, A CAPABILITY TO DEFEND THEIR OWN MOST IMPORTANT ASSETS.

BOTH WE AND THE SAUDIS FULLY REALIZE THAT THE AIR DEFENSE ENHANCEMENT PACKAGE WE HAVE SUBMITTED TO THE CONGRESS WILL NOT ENABLE THE SAUDIS TO DEFEND THEMSELVES AGAINST A DIRECT SOVIET ATTACK. ONLY WE CAN DO THAT, AND THEN ONLY IF OUR FORCES ARE SOUGHT AND WELCOMED BY THE PEOPLE AND GOVERNMENTS OF THE REGION.

THE PROPOSED SALE, HOWEVER, WILL VASTLY ENHANCE OUR ABILITY TO DO SO. IT WILL, FOR EXAMPLE, ENSURE THE EXISTENCE OF AN EXTENSIVE LOGISTICS BASE AND SUPPORT INFRASTRUCTURE IN SAUDI ARABIA -- INCLUDING SPARE PARTS -- THAT WILL FACILITATE RAPID U.S. REINFORCEMENT IN AN EMERGENCY. IT WOULD ALSO EXPAND OPPORTUNITIES FOR CLOSE COOPERATION BETWEEN SAUDI, U.S., AND OTHER REGIONAL FORCES IN A MANNER THAT COULD GREATLY UPGRADE THE AIR DEFENSES AND STATE OF MILITARY READINESS OF THE ENTIRE AREA. BUT EQUALLY IMPORTANT, THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND SAUDI ARABIA THAT WOULD BE EVIDENCED BY THE SALE COULD, IN ITSELF, REPRESENT A SIGNIFICANT

DETERRENT TO SOVIET ADVENTURISM.

IT IS AGAINST THIS BACKGROUND THAT OUR PROPOSALS MUST BE VIEWED. THE THREAT TO BE PROTECTED AGAINST IS REAL, AND THE EQUIPMENT WE PROPOSE TO SELL IS BOTH REASONABLE AND APPROPRIATE TO THE MILITARY TASK OF PROTECTING RESOURCES IN WHICH WE HAVE THE MOST DIRECT AND OBVIOUS SELF-INTEREST.

THE SAUDI OIL FACILITIES LIE ON VERY FLAT LAND ADJACENT TO THE PERSIAN GULF AND ARE THUS HIGHLY VULNERABLE TO SURPRISE ATTACK BY LOW-FLYING AIRCRAFT. EARLY WARNING IS CRITICAL. GROUND RADARS ARE ABLE TO PROVIDE LESS THAN FIVE MINUTES WARNING OF ATTACK BY LOW-FLYING PLANES COMING OVER THE WATER. THUS ENEMY PLANES COULD INFLICT CRIPPLING DAMAGE TO THE OIL FACILITIES BEFORE SAUDI INTERCEPTORS COULD RESPOND.

THE FOUR ELEMENTS OF THE CURRENTLY PROPOSED SALE -- AWACS, AIR REFUELING TANKERS, CONFORMAL FUEL TANKS FOR THE F-15S, AND AIR-TO-AIR MISSILES -- WOULD DRAMATICALLY IMPROVE THE SAUDI CAPABILITY TO DEFEND AGAINST REGIONAL AIR ATTACKS:

-- THE AWACS AIRCRAFT, WHICH OPERATES AT ABOUT 30,000 FEET, WOULD PROVIDE SUFFICIENT WARNING OF AN AIR ATTACK TO ENABLE SAUDI FIGHTERS TO SCRAMBLE AND INTERCEPT THE ENEMY BEFORE THEY CAN CARRY OUT THEIR MISSION.

-- THE CONFORMAL FUEL TANKS AND THE AIR REFUELING TANKER AIRCRAFT WOULD ENABLE THE F-15S TO MAINTAIN PATROLS AND DEFEND EAST COAST PETROLEUM FACILITIES WHILE OPERATING OUT OF INTERIOR BASES THAT ARE LESS VULNERABLE TO PRE-EMPTIVE ATTACK.

-- SIDEWINDER AIR-TO-AIR MISSILES, WITH THE CAPABILITY FOR HEAD-ON ATTACK AGAINST HOSTILE AIRCRAFT, SIGNIFICANTLY IMPROVE THE ABILITY OF SAUDI INTERCEPTORS TO ENGAGE AND DESTROY ATTACKING AIRCRAFT BEFORE THEY CAN DESTROY THE OIL FACILITIES - EVEN WITH THE ADVANCE WARNING PROVIDED BY THE AWACS.

IN ADDITION TO HELPING MEET IMMEDIATE NEEDS, THIS SALE WOULD BRING WITH IT A VERY HIGH DEGREE OF LONG-TERM MILITARY AND TECHNICAL COLLABORATION BETWEEN THE U.S. AND SAUDI ARABIA, AND WILL ENSURE THE SUBSTANTIAL PRESENCE OF U.S. MAINTENANCE AND SUPPORT PERSONNEL IN SAUDI ARABIA THROUGHOUT THE LIFE OF THE SYSTEMS.

THE ADMINISTRATION HAS CAREFULLY STUDIED THE IMPLICATIONS OF THIS SALE, AND OF THE LARGER RELATIONSHIP WHICH IT SYMBOLIZES, FOR ISRAELI SECURITY. WE RECOGNIZE THAT ANY ENHANCEMENT OF SAUDI MILITARY CAPABILITIES COULD COMPLICATE THE TASK FACED BY ISRAELI DEFENSE PLANNERS. YET ISRAEL ENJOYS TODAY -- AND WILL CONTINUE TO ENJOY AFTER OUR

PROPOSED SALES ARE COMPLETED -- SO DECISIVE A SUPERIORITY OVER ANY COMBINATION OF REGIONAL FORCES THAT THE PRACTICAL IMPACT OF OUR PROPOSALS ON ISRAELI SECURITY WOULD BE SMALL. ON THE OTHER HAND, ISRAEL WILL BE A DIRECT BENEFICIARY OF A U.S. POLICY TOWARDS SAUDI ARABIA AND THE OTHER GULF STATES THAT WILL REDUCE THE RISK OF CONFLICT IN THE REGION, AND ENHANCE OUR ABILITY TO BRING MODERATE ARAB STATES INTO THE MIDDLE EAST PEACE PROCESS.

THE MYTHOLOGY THAT HAS GROWN UP AROUND THE AWACS IS EXTRAORDINARY. CONTRARY TO CLAIMS, THE AWACS CANNOT COLLECT PHOTOGRAPHIC OR ELECTRONIC INTELLIGENCE. NOR CAN IT COLLECT ANY INTELLIGENCE AT ALL ON GROUND TARGETS. THE ONLY INFORMATION IT COLLECTS IS THE MOST PERISHABLE KIND -- AIRCRAFT TRACKS ON A RADAR SCREEN WHICH BECOME USELESS IN A MATTER OF MINUTES IF THEY CANNOT BE ACTED UPON. NEITHER DO THEY HAVE AN OFFENSIVE CAPACITY THAT COULD JEOPARDIZE ISRAELI SECURITY, NOR WILL THE AWACS WE WILL BE PROVIDING THE SAUDIS BE EQUIPPED WITH THE KIND OF HIGHLY ADVANCED TECHNOLOGY WHOSE CAPTURE BY THE SOVIETS WOULD JEOPARDIZE SIGNIFICANT U.S. SECURITY INTERESTS. THE REASON FOR THIS IS THAT THE MOST SENSITIVE ITEMS WE HAVE ON OUR OWN AWACS ARE NOT REQUIRED TO MEET THE KINDS OF THREATS WHICH THE SAUDIS FACE. IN BRIEF, THE AWACS WE PROPOSE TO SELL THE SAUDIS WILL GREATLY IMPROVE THEIR

ABILITY TO PROTECT THEIR EASTERN OIL FIELDS; BUT THEY WILL NEITHER JEOPARDIZE CRITICAL AMERICAN TECHNOLOGY NOR SIGNIFICANTLY IMPROVE THE SAUDIS' ABILITY TO CONDUCT OR COORDINATE ATTACKS AGAINST ISRAEL.

WE HAVE BEEN FULLY AWARE, OF COURSE, OF THE DEEP CONCERN WHICH MEMBERS OF THE CONGRESS HAVE FELT ABOUT THE POSSIBLE RISKS TO ISRAEL AND TO THE SECURITY OF HIGHLY SENSITIVE MILITARY TECHNOLOGY THAT COULD BE POSED BY THE PROPOSED SALES. WE HAVE SOUGHT TO MEET THESE CONCERNS, WHICH WE SHARE, NOT ONLY THROUGH THE SELECTION OF THE SPECIFIC COMPONENTS TO BE INCORPORATED IN THE AWACS TO BE SOLD TO SAUDI ARABIA, BUT BY WORKING IN CONCERT WITH THE SAUDI GOVERNMENT OVER THE PAST SEVERAL MONTHS TO DEVELOP VARIOUS ARRANGEMENTS DESIGNED TO MEET THEM. OUR DISCUSSIONS HAVE NOW BEEN CONCLUDED. WE BELIEVE THAT THE RESULTING UNDERSTANDINGS, WHICH WILL COME INTO EFFECT AFTER CONSUMMATION OF THE SALE, WILL ENSURE THE SECURITY OF THE AWACS SYSTEM, AND THE DEGREE OF CONTINUING U.S. PARTICIPATION IN SAUDI AWACS OPERATIONS THAT RESPOND TO THE FUNDAMENTAL CONCERNS ABOUT THE SALE THAT HAVE BEEN RAISED DURING THE COURSE OF OUR CONSULTATIONS WITH THE CONGRESS.

THE SAUDIS HAVE AGREED TO ENSURE AN IMPORTANT U.S. ROLE IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE SAUDI AIR DEFENSE SYSTEM

AND TO MOVE FORWARD IN OTHER WAYS TO DEEPEN THE LONG-STANDING SECURITY COOPERATION BETWEEN OUR TWO COUNTRIES IN WHICH WE HAVE PLAYED A KEY ROLE IN TRAINING THE SAUDI AIR FORCE. WITHIN THIS FRAMEWORK, WE HAVE REACHED UNDERSTANDINGS ON A NUMBER OF SPECIFIC PROVISIONS GOVERNING THE AWACS AIRCRAFT THAT PROVIDE IMPORTANT BENEFITS FOR U.S. SECURITY INTERESTS: THESE ARRANGEMENTS HAVE BEEN REACHED IN THE CONTEXT OF FIRM SAUDI AGREEMENT ON INFORMATION SHARING, SECURITY OF EQUIPMENT, NO UNAUTHORIZED TRANSFER OF DATA OR EQUIPMENT, AND USE OF THE AWACS ONLY IN A DEFENSIVE MISSION WITHIN SAUDI BORDERS.

THIS MEANS:

-- THERE WILL BE COMPLETE DATA SHARING WITH THE U.S. ON A CONTINUOUS BASIS.

-- THERE WILL BE NO SHARING OF AWACS DATA WITH ANY OTHER PARTIES WITHOUT U.S. CONSENT.

-- ONLY CAREFULLY-SCREENED SAUDI AND U.S. NATIONALS WILL BE PERMITTED TO BE INVOLVED WITH THESE AIRCRAFT. GIVEN THE SHORTAGE OF SAUDI AIRCREWS AND TECHNICIANS THIS MEANS THAT THERE WILL BE AN AMERICAN PRESENCE IN THE AIRCRAFT AND ON THE GROUND WELL INTO THE 1990'S.

-- THERE WILL BE NO OPERATION OF SAUDI AWACS OUTSIDE SAUDI AIRSPACE.

-- THERE WILL BE EXTENSIVE AND ELABORATE SECURITY MEASURES FOR SAFEGUARDING EQUIPMENT AND TECHNOLOGY, INCLUDING:

- U.S. INSPECTION TEAMS WILL MONITOR THE PERFORMANCE OF ALL EQUIPMENT ASSOCIATED WITH THE AWACS SALE;

- SPECIAL FACILITIES WILL BE CONSTRUCTED TO PROVIDE ROUND THE CLOCK SECURITY PROTECTION AGAINST UNAUTHORIZED ENTRY;

- ALL OF THE AGREED ARRANGEMENTS FOR PROTECTING THE SECURITY OF AWACS MUST BE APPROVED BY THE U.S. AT LEAST ONE YEAR BEFORE ANY AWACS ARE DELIVERED TO THE SAUDIS.

TAKEN TOGETHER, THIS PACKAGE OF SAFEGUARDS AND AGREEMENTS ADDRESSES THE FUNDAMENTAL CONCERNS THAT HAVE BEEN VOICED ABOUT THE SALE AND ALSO REFLECTS A SAUDI WILLINGNESS TO WORK WITH US AND ENGAGE OUR MUTUAL CONCERNS.

THE FACT OF THESE CONCERNS ILLUSTRATES THE DILEMMAS WHICH THE UNITED STATES MUST INEVITABLY FACE AS IT MEETS ITS GLOBAL RESPONSIBILITIES. WE HAVE INTERESTS -- VITAL INTERESTS -- THAT REQUIRE THAT WE DEVELOP CLOSE COOPERATIVE RELATIONSHIPS WITH NATIONS WITHIN A PARTICULAR REGION WHICH HAVE LONG-STANDING DIFFERENCES. THE FACT OF OUR LONG-TERM FRIENDSHIP FOR ISRAEL AND COMMITMENT TO HER SECURITY . NOT IN ITSELF ANY REASON TO SEEK OTHER THAN

THE CLOSEST RELATIONSHIP WITH SAUDI ARABIA. FROM A STRATEGIC POINT OF VIEW, EACH IS VITAL TO DIFFERENT BUT COMPLEMENTARY AMERICAN INTERESTS: ISRAEL TO OUR SECURITY INTERESTS IN THE EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN; AND SAUDI ARABIA, TO THOSE IN THE PERSIAN GULF.

AS WE FORGE AND STRENGTHEN THESE RELATIONSHIPS, WE MUST KEEP IN MIND THAT SECURITY COOPERATION IS NOT A COMMODITY TO BE BOUGHT AND SOLD OR HAGGLED OVER. IT IS A PROCESS THAT MUST BE BASED ON MUTUAL CONFIDENCE AND MUTUAL INTERESTS. THE QUESTION IS WHETHER THE NECESSARY BASIS OF COOPERATION CAN SURVIVE IF OUR COMMITMENT TO SAUDI ARABIA'S SECURITY IS COMPROMISED. TO DENY SAUDI ARABIA THIS BASIC MEANS OF SELF-DEFENSE IS TO PUT IN SERIOUS DOUBT THE CONSISTENCY OF OUR SUPPORT AND OUR RELIABILITY AS A SECURITY PARTNER.

THE SAUDI LEADERSHIP BELIEVES THAT THE SAUDI NATIONAL INTEREST IS BEST SERVED BY THE KIND OF SECURITY RELATIONSHIP THAT WE HAVE PROPOSED. THE POINT TO KEEP IN MIND, HOWEVER, IS THAT THIS JUDGMENT IS MADE IN THE FACE OF CONSIDERABLE PRESSURE, PRIMARILY FROM THE RADICAL ELEMENTS OF THE ARAB WORLD. THAT PRESSURE CAN BE SUBSTANTIALLY INCREASED. THE SAUDI CAPACITY TO RESIST IT IS VERY LARGELY DEPENDENT UPON THEIR CONFIDENCE IN THE UNITED STATES AND IN THEIR ABILITY TO DEAL WITH LOCAL THREATS.

FOR COMPELLING REASONS, POLITICAL AND NATIONALISTIC, THE SAUDIS CANNOT MOVE TO AN EXPLICIT DEPENDENCE UPON THE U.S. IN THOSE AREAS OF DEFENSE IN WHICH THEY ARE POTENTIALLY BUT CLEARLY CAPABLE OF LOOKING AFTER THEMSELVES. SUCH A POLICY WOULD SEVERELY UNDERMINE THEIR LEADERSHIP AND INFLUENCE IN THE ARAB WORLD -- AN INFLUENCE WHICH SERVES OUR NATIONAL INTERESTS.

WHAT HAS TO BE UNDERSTOOD, IN SHORT, IS THAT THE ONLY VIABLE RELATIONSHIP IN THE MIDDLE EAST TODAY IS ONE THAT IS BASED ON A MUTUAL RESPECT FOR ONE ANOTHER'S SOVEREIGNTY, AND BUILT ON THE SOLID ROCK OF A MUTUALITY OF INTERESTS. THE STATIONING OF SIGNIFICANT U.S. COMBAT FORCES ON SAUDI SOIL IS SIMPLY NOT A FEASIBLE ALTERNATIVE TO STRENGTHENING THEIR CAPACITY TO LOOK AFTER THEIR OWN DEFENSES TO THE BEST OF THEIR ABILITY. NO NATION SHOULD BE EXPECTED TO DELEGATE SUCH RESPONSIBILITIES TO ANOTHER AND DISTANT NATION -- ESPECIALLY WHEN IT HAS ALTERNATIVE SOURCES FOR ENTIRELY ADEQUATE SUBSTITUTES, AS THE SAUDIS HAVE IN THE CASE OF THE BRITISH NIMROD AS AN ENTIRELY WORKABLE ALTERNATIVE TO THE AWACS.

FINALLY, LET ME BRIEFLY TURN TO THE QUESTION OF WHAT THE CONSEQUENCES WOULD BE IF CONGRESS DOES NOT APPROVE THE SALE -- CONSEQUENCES FOR THE UNITED STATES, FOR ISRAEL, FOR AN ENDURING PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST. THE

DOWNSIDE RISKS ARE LARGE.

• ALTHOUGH A MUTUALITY OF SAUDI AND U.S. INTERESTS WOULD REMAIN, DOUBTS ABOUT THE VALUE OF U.S. COMMITMENTS WOULD GROW. ALMOST CERTAINLY THE ABILITY OF THE SAUDI LEADERSHIP TO ACCEPT THE RISKS OF EMBRACING OUR REGIONAL STRATEGY AND OF SUPPORTING THE PEACE PROCESS WOULD DECLINE. SIMILARLY, SAUDI WILLINGNESS AND CAPACITY TO EXERCISE A MODERATING POLITICAL INFLUENCE IN ARAB COUNCILS WOULD ALSO SUFFER. WHILE WE MIGHT SUCCEED IN MUDDLING THROUGH, FAILURE TO COMPLETE THIS PRESENT TRANSACTION WOULD BE SO LARGE AND SO IMPORTANT A SIGNAL, THAT OUR ADVERSARIES WOULD BE SORELY TEMPTED TO TAKE ADVANTAGE OF IT.

THE RESULT, INEVITABLY, WILL BE THAT OUR REGIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY WILL BE UNDERMINED AND OUR ABILITY TO BUILD A SECURITY FRAMEWORK AS AN EFFECTIVE COUNTER TO GROWING SOVIET POLITICAL AND MILITARY PRESSURE WILL SUFFER A MAJOR SET-BACK. THE STRATEGIC BALANCE OF POWER IN THE PERSIAN GULF WILL REMAIN WEIGHTED IN THE SOVIETS' FAVOR, OPENING FURTHER OPPORTUNITIES FOR ENCROACHMENT AND SUBVERSION..

IRONICALLY, ISRAEL WOULD PROBABLY PAY THE MAJOR PRICE FOR THIS DEFEAT. SHE ALMOST SURELY WILL FACE A SAUDI ARABIA WHICH BUYS FROM THE EUROPEANS VIRTUALLY THE

SAME MILITARY CAPABILITIES AS WE PROPOSE TO SELL; BUT THIS EQUIPMENT WILL NOT BE SUBJECT TO THE SAFEGUARDS AND RESTRAINTS THAT WOULD ACCOMPANY OUR SALES. AND TO THE EXTENT THAT U.S. INFLUENCE AMONG THE MODERATE ARAB STATES DECLINES AND THE AREA BECOMES SUSCEPTIBLE TO SOVIET PENETRATION, ISRAEL'S OWN LONG-TERM SECURITY AND WELL-BEING WILL ALSO BE LESS SOLIDLY BASED.

A FURTHER, PERHAPS GREATER, PRICE ISRAEL WOULD HAVE TO PAY IS THE WEAKENING OF OUR PROSPECTS FOR BRINGING THE PIVOTAL MODERATE ARAB STATE TO SUPPORT OUR APPROACH TO THE PEACE PROCESS.

THE KEY ROLE PLAYED BY SAUDI ARABIA IN BRINGING ABOUT A CEASEFIRE IN LEBANON DEMONSTRATES THE GREAT PROGRESS THAT CAN BE MADE IN THE SEARCH FOR PEACE BY WORKING TOGETHER. INTERRUPT THAT RELATIONSHIP, CAUSE THE SAUDIS TO DISTANCE THEMSELVES -- HOWEVER QUIETLY -- FROM THE UNITED STATES, AND WE FUNDAMENTALLY JEOPARDIZE OUR ABILITY TO BRING PERMANENT PEACE TO THE MIDDLE EAST AND TO DIFFUSE WHAT REMAINS THE GREATEST POTENTIAL SOURCE OF A TRULY MAJOR CONFRONTATION BETWEEN EAST AND WEST.

THESE, MR. CHAIRMAN AND MEMBERS OF THE COMMITTEE, ARE THE STAKES AS WE SEE THEM; THE REASONS WHY WE ASK FOR YOUR SUPPORT FOR INITIATIVES WHICH WE BELIEVE HOLD THE

-15-

KEYS TO THE PROTECTION OF VITAL AMERICAN INTERESTS AND
THE PROSPECT FOR LASTING PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST.
